T HE Royal Commission on British trade unions, 1867-9, was brought to life by two events, either of which alone might well have proved fatal to unionism. The decision of the court of Queen's Bench in Hornby v. Close had questioned the very legality of trade unions, had declared them to be against public policy, and had removed their funds from the protection of the law.' In addition to this, the renewal of outrages and murder by the Saw-Grinders of Sheffield had produced a whirlwind of anti-unionism in public opinion? It was the Sheffield employers led by their bitterly anti-unionist M.P., J. A.
Roebuck, who first demanded an investigation by the national government, and when the request, seconded though it was by the unioniststhey had no alternative-was conceded by the cabinet the workers naturally felt that "Labour on Trial" was the keynote of the hour.· Outrages and murder, an apparently class-conscious court of Queen's Bench, employers in full cry against unions and a press almost unanimous in denunciation of them-all created the background for a Royal Commission to which workmen could scarcely look forward with pleasure. The shock-wave these events produced in the labour movement at large can be seen in all directions. It is apparent in the pages of the BeeHive and the Commonwealth, the leading labour papers of the day; in the tense meetings of the Conference of Amalgamated Trades, and their despatch of George Odger, a union official, to Sheffield to make an investigation; in the adding of rewards to those already offered by the employers and the government for information leading to the arrest of the "Sheffield Fenians"; and so on. The scare was general. < Pessimism about the Royal Commission which had originated in these untoward circumstances deepened when the membership of the commission was announced. The BeeHive declared at once:
We have no confidence in the majority of the members of that Commission. Some of them have been large employers of labour, who have been mixed up in lock-outs, and all belong to a class of society that have generally little sympathy with, and less knowledge of, the working classes. To have given confidence to the trades unions there should have been at least 2 or 3 intelligent workmen on the Commission .... G The editors found no reason to change their minds after the Commission had begun its work and five sessions had been held. All but four of the Commissioners at the most "appear to be dead against trades unions," the BeeHive reported." Much stronger criticism of Commission personnel was voiced at the Trade Union Congresses of 1868 and 1869. 7 All such complaining was doubtless an expression of unionist fears, however well founded in fact it may have been; adverse legislation was confidently expected to result from the inquiry. George Howell recalled, when writing his recollections of the mid-Victorian labour movement, that there had been ample evidence in the speeches in the House of Commons and in the reports of the press that the purpose of the Royal Commission was not merely the unearthing of unionist crime, but the supplying of a pretext for the suppression of the unions or the stringent curtailment of the liberty the law had allowed them."
The outcome of the investigation was far from being what the unions feared. It proved to be a milestone in their progress, not the means of their destruction. Even the Majority Report of the Commissioners recommended no adverse legislation. Tbe real fruit of the crisis was Bruce's Trade Union Act of 1871-the unions' "Charter of Liberties"-which was completed by further concessions in Cross's Act of 1875. These statutes granted unions full legality, a privileged position with regard to financial liability, protection of funds, and all the other reforms they had wished.
That the actual, if long-term, results of the crisis of 1866-7 were so far from realizing the fears of the unionists is to be explained by a number of factors. Perhaps the most important was the new franchise of 1867 by which working-class votes became of importance to the politicians and both parties moved to satisfy labour's legislative de-mands. A significant role was also played by the Parliamentary Committee of the Trade Union Congress, which, with the expert assistance of such middle-class radicals and liberals as Henry Crompton, William Harcourt, A. J. Mundella, and Frederic Harrison, maintained a sustained and most successful lobby at Westminster. But the unionists were also assisted by the nature of the Commission's activities. What had at first seemed certain to be an investigation of crime and violence on the part of trade unions in places like Sheffield, was broadened into a survey not only of unionism as a whole and in all its aspects and operations but of masters' associations as well. In the end the outrages which led to the Royal Commission played an insignificant part in determining its outcome. They were delegated to two subsidiary commissions which dealt quickly with the events in Sheffield and Manchester. The evidence attracted public notice only once-when Broadhead made his famous confessions--and then was soon forgotten.'· The focussing of the Commission's work on the general and normal operations of the unions of the whole land rather than on the criminal activities of the raw fringe was a triumph for labour and went far to inoculate the Commission. Spencer Walpole, the Home Secretary, explained to the House of Commons, when introducing the Bill to give the Commission powers, why the government had accepted the unionist recommendations for a general inquiry rather than the employers' plan for an inquest on outrages. The labour laws of the country were, he pointed out, unsatisfactory and uncertain and there was general ignorance in Parliament on the whole matter. The Hornby v. Close decision and the Sheffield outrages had made some legislation necessary and both Parliament and Government needed to be better informed. The general scope which was for these reasons given the Commission enabled the unions to put their best foot forward. George Potter, editor of the BeeHive, was even able to find some basis for optimism in the terms of reference. The inquiry would, he pointed out, provide a splendid opportunity for educating the public and clearing away popular prejudice and ignorance." . Finally, it appears that the outcome of the crisis of 1866-7 owed something to the skill and energy with which the unions' interests were managed in the Commission by Frederic Harrison, the official representative of organized labour. The appointment of a representative of labour to a Royal Commission dealing with labour affairs was in 18'67 without precedent. Harrison's addition to the body therefore gave the unions an unexpected advantage which, even if it was offset to a degree by the appointment of a representative of the employers, placed the union interest in a stronger position than could have been anticipated. The ideal would, of course, have been the appointment of two or three union men. Both George Potter's London Working Men's Association, representing the more radical wing of organized labour, and the Conference of Amalgamated Trades-London Trades Council leaders representing the great "amalgamateds" waited on Spencer Walpole in February, 1867, to press for the inclusion of some members of the working classes. The deputation of the London Working Men's Association did, however, secure what they considered "the next best thing" -the appointment of a "gentleman" representative who knew the unions and had the confidence of their members. Walpole gave in to their pressure on this point and asked for names. Those mentioned by the PotterHartwell delegation make a good list of the middle-class radicals who were in the 1860's acting with the trade unions as apologists and expert counsellors-Frederic Harrison, Professor E. S. Beesly, Professor gave general satisfaction to all branches of the union movement. He was prominent in the small group of middle-class radicals who collaborated actively with the unions; he had long been their apologist in the press, and he had for years past been a regular writer in the labour newspapers.Ii Walpole told the House of Commons:
[Harrison] has written more ably on this subject, in favour of trades unions, than any other author I know of. If any Member in the House has read Mr. Harrison's works he will know that I do not exaggerate in the least when I affinn that there is no man who more fully, more com~ pletely or more ably represents the views of the working classes than Mr.
Harrison. Hi
The appointment came as a complete surprise to Harrison. He had been consulted neither by the unionist nor by the Home Office and learned of what had been done only from The Times the next morning." He accepted the appointment despite the fact that it appeared to be professional suicide to do so. His father warned that his opportunities in Lincoln's Inn would be sadly reduced and more than one eminent solicitor told him he must expect to quit the profession altogether if he served on the Commission as the representative of the workers." Such was the contaminating power of trade unions in 1867. Harrison's legal career did not, in fact, long survive his Commission work.
Harrison found his nine colleagues not much to his liking. ' • Though inlpanelled as a judicial body most of the members of the Commission were partial and prejudiced. Sir William Erie, the Chairman, was anti-union and a dogged adherent of the obsolete doctrine of restraint of trade, individual contracts, and the orthodox plutonomy of the day; Roebuck was notoriously anti-union; Herman Merivale was a devotee of orthodox economics; Sir Daniel Gooch, the Chairman of the Great Western Railway, and William Mathews, the Chairman of the Midland Iron Masters' League, were men of big business and both keen opponents of unions. Harrison found that only the two peers, Lord Elcho and the Earl of Lichfield, were judicial. He was greatly impressed with the allility and sense of justice of both of them and in recollection thought that Elcho had "completely dominated the Com- Professor Beesly posted as the unionist spokesman in the press"-it is clear, even from a cursory review of the Royal Commission's ten volumes of evidence, that Harrison was the most energetic examiner and cross-examiner, always alert to bring out the union position to the best advantage and to deal with the charges of the anti-union witnesses when their turn came. There seem to have been grounds for his conceit in thinking that the union cause suffered in his absence."
Harrison had a two-fold task to perform in the Commission. One was to counter the attacks of the masters and their friends and to defeat them in their endeavour to make the Commission the means of suppressing the unions by legislative enactment. He had to offset their evidence and expose their prejudice and ignorance. On the other hand, he had, of course, to bring out the unions' argument: their strength and the scope of their operations; their importance to the working classes and to society; and so on. He had to show that they deserved social acceptance as well as legal recognition and protection.
Of the two tasks the former was the more difficult. One source of trouble was the revelations of unionist terrorism made before the Sheffield inquiry by Broadhead, revelations which played completely into the hands of the opposition. day. There will be stiff work and I shall have a bad time. I have not met Roebuck since the Sheffield business grew serious. I am going to urge that the Government instruct the Sheffield Commission to extend their inquiry into ail cases of outrage which come before us. They are very few and very vague. We had up last time an inspector of police of Lancashire who could speak to no case of even suspected outrage in his recollection. 26 The Commission was at that very time examining anti-union witnesses, and Harrison had to redouble his activity in order to make up the ground that had been lost in Sheffield. The sittings of June and July, 1867, found him doing his utmost to co;mter the attacks of the party of capital. When the Commission resumed its work in the late autumn he was still conducting a one-man defensive action against the succession of anti-union witnesses who appeared in November.
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It appears from the Reports of the Commission that it was in the November sessions, after the Broadhead affair had somewhat died down, that he had his first real opportunity to upset the masters' argument.
The second major problem which faced Harrison in dealing with the critics was the impressive evidence presented on behalf of the masters by Alfred Mault, secretary of the General Builders' Association. Mault appeared before the Commission on five occasions in May-June, 1867, and on four gave evidence at great length?' Harrison was not present the first time Mault was examined, on May 7, but he read the evidence given by him on that occasion 2 • and heard him the other four times. Harrison was deeply impressed with his indictment of the unions. Indeed, he confessed to Beesly that he was almost converted by it:
His evidence is serious. He has a mass of cases of petty exactions all over the North chiefly against the masons and plasterers. It is worse than anything we ever heard of and is very damaging. I am free to say that if the unions cannot get over it, some of them and certainly the Masons deserve all that was ever said of them and are as mere organs of class tyranny.
My God! Think if I were to publish a formal Recantation. But I keep my counsel as yet. Keep this to yourself. He formally exonerates Applegarth and his society. Mault is an exceedingly clever fellow who has got up his case perfectly. If they can't beat him the game is up.'· Harrison had some of Mault's assertions checked by his clients·' and in the sittings of May 14 and June 5 he set out to shake his position as far as he could. By persistent questioning and the introduction of a great deal of new evidence, all of it intensely factual, whiclt showed that he had an intimate knowledge of the matters in question and had been well briefed for his cross-examination, Harrison managed to cltange the complexion of the situation somewhat. He was able to upset Mault in his insistence that the unions were opposed to the use of macltines for the sawing and grinding of stone; he showed that Mault 27See Third, Fourth and Fifth Reports, passim, which cover these months. Most of the witnesses who appeared at this time were anti-union. 28Mault appeared on May 7, 14,21, 28, and June 5, 1867. On , the first two occasions . the whole session was given to him and on the last two he was questioned at considerable length. opposition to strikes was scarcely worse than co-operation in their support.
The other side of the Commission's subject was presented by union members and by the few pro-union employers like Mundella.·· Of the former the members of the Junta were the most prominent and important, and things might well have gone very differently for the unions had it not been for the imposing weight of evidence presented by those cautious, conservative heads of the great national organizations. It was comparatively easy for Robert Applegarth, William Allan, and the rest to dissociate themselves from the turbulent little unions and to prove that the mass of their members were orderly, law-abiding citizens. It was the strategy of these members of the Junta to show that they were much more representative of unionism than the Saw-Grinders of Sheffield, a task made the easier when the party of capital mistakenly concentrated its attack on the most respectable and defensible part of organized labour. s , Applegarth, whose role on the unionists' side was at least as significant as that of Mault on the Masters',3. put the Amalgamated Engineers forward as the model union and dwelt at length on the services it provided in the form of benefits. Perhaps the best illustration of his moderation and of that of the unions he spoke for is to be found in what he had to say about picketing (he would have moral suasion only) and in the legislation which he proposed. According to Applegarth the national unions sought no more from the legislature than protection of their funds from embezzlement and the right to invest them in property, securities, and co-operative enterprises. 3T Objection could hardly be made to such modest requests.
Harrison was less active when the Commission was taking the evidence of Applegarth and the unionists. Other Commissioners could elicit the facts, and the evidence did not then look prepared, as it often did when a representative of the unions was in action. Nevertheless, Harrison did take a large share of the questioning here also, conducting the inquiry himself on occasion and intervening frequently to rescue a unionist in distress or to correct the impressions left by another questioner. ss The published record makes it clear that he was quick to bring out the beneficial side of unions for the Commission and to put the best, the most constructive, face upon them. Analysis of the voluminous evidence put into the record by the union men is out of the question here, but one or two features of the presentation may be mentioned. First, there was obviously a good deal of careful planning behind the appearance of the wage-earners before the Commission. Harrison collaborated closely with Applegarth outside the Commission, consulting with him on the proceedings and arranging for him to go to Bradford, for example, to check on some of Mault's evidence." He arranged for Howell's appearance as a witness and wrote to tell him what the subjects of questioning would be.'o There is further evidence of efficient organization in the Commission itself where Harrison regularly asked unionist witnesses leading questions to enable them to put into the record statements that had been prepared in ad vance. On other occasions, Harrison would state a point or position at some length in the form of a question to which the witness had only to give his assent." It should be added, however, that he did not always get the answers he wanted and certainly not everything was rehearsed. It must also be noted that Harrison did on occasion expose objectionable elements in union practices and showed no disposition to hush them up. He was, for example, very critical of a masons' rule limiting the work that one man might do in a day.'2 But for the most part the unions' spokesman left such matters to Roebuck and Mathews who brought out whatever could be found against the unions. Throughout Harrison displayed a close acquaintance with the problems, developments, and practices of trade unions as well as a full knowledge of their argument for acceptance and legalization.
The Commission finished taking evidence in J uiy, 1868, and did not meet for the purpose of considering its report until December. There is little to show what took place during the interval. Harrison was certainly busy with Commission business and had in September to ask John Morley to postpone an article promised for the Fortnightly Review." It was during these months that he prepared the memorandum dated November, 1868, which was placed before the Commission when it resumed its meetings." Once the final task of drafting recommendations for the government had been taken up there was strenuous work for the unions' representative and the business was not concluded until March, 1869. In December, Harrison wrote to his friend Beesly: "It is very hard work [in the Commission], and I have been talking, protesting all day and am quite tired. God, I wish we were in it together .... It is immensely exciting. We go at it every day and all day."" In the following February they were still at it. As he explained to Louisa Shore, he had not been out of London during the holidays and had been living in "Bluebook-land ... a very ogrelike country." He went on: "The fact is I have been harried out of existence by the Commission. We have had four months of constant fights, and I have written volumes of notes and memoranda and letters. Non letter-writing phantom !-Why I am a letter-writing machine all steel and iron, or if a phantom at all I have been worn to it by letter-writing."" "Months of constant fights" referred, of course, to the struggle for the final report between the two parties among the Commissioners--those who were prepared to recommend little improvement of the unions' position, and those who were prepared to recommend acceptance of all their demands. Booth, Roebuck, and Erie were in the former camp; Harrison and Hughes in the latter, supported on occasion by Merivale and the two peers, Elcho and Litchfield." The wrangling went on at great length. In January, 1869, Henry Crompton, who knew from Harrison what was going on in the Commission, wrote to Mundella: "It is impossible to say what it [the report] will be-probably a mere skeleton compromise";" and at mid-February Harrison wrote that the report was still not settled.'· The discussions in the Commission were based on a memorandum presented by the secretary, James Booth, a memorandum prepared, Harrison later recalled, at the instigation of the chairman, Sir William Erie. The chairman hoped, apparently, to get an unanimous report by modifying Booth's draft so far as was necessary in order to satisfy the other members of the Commission.'o Harrison and Hughes set out to alter it radically and according to a letter Harrison wrote at the time and his recollections many years later, they were highly successful in this endeavour. He wrote to Beesly in December: The strategy of Harrison and Hughes was plainly to remove all they and their unionist friends disliked from the Booth draft and mould it, so far as they could, to their own liking, getting as many of the trade union demands into it as possible. But it seems clear that Harrison had from the outset a separate report in mind, for he wrote to Hughes to this effect before the sessions of the Commission were resumed in December, 1868. In a letter marked "Confidential" which must have been written in the late summer or autumn of 1868, he proposed to Hughes the bringing in of a separate report which would be, he said, an armoury of liberal ideas on the subject and which might exert a continuing influence on government, parliament, and public until "our side won," and he set forth all the principles which later were to appear in the Minority Report. 52 It is clear he still had this plan in mind when he wrote to Beesly in December, for even though he seemed to be having great success in whittling down Booth's memorandum and putting into it his own ideas about combination, he remarked that it was still a question in his mind whether he and Hughes would sign it. Apparently, then, the strategy of the pro-union Commissioners was to change the Booth draft as much as they could, though they had no hope of making it embody their ideas completely, and then to bring in their own report as well. Professor Lujo Brentano of the University of Breslau summed the situation up conveniently in a letter of 1873. He wrote Harrison asking for information about the Trade Union Commission to use in a controversy it is now; but that they the majority expected you also to sign their report and that when you and Mr. Hughes and Ld. Lichfield refused and you and Mr. Hughes made a separate statement the majority was so angry that it ordered Mr. Booth's report to be appended to the report in the same types as the report. Please tell me whether I remember rightly that that was the course which the Commission took. 58 Harrison replied that Brentano's statements were "strictly correct.""
The outcome of the Commission's discussions of December, January, and February was, at least in some measure, what Harrison had planned. There was no agreed set of findings, no unanimous report. A Majority Report was signed by seven of the Commissioners: ErIe, Elcho, Gooch, Merivale, Booth, Roebuck, and Mathews. To this there were three Dissents--one entered by Elcho alone, consisting of one sentence; another by Elcho and Merivale of half a page; and a third signed by Lichfield, Hughes, and Harrison of two full pages. Attached to the Third Dissent there was a "Detailed Statement referred to in the foregoing Dissent," signed by Harrison and Hughes alone and running to twenty-two pages." This last was the Minority Report. As Harrison explained to Brentano, it expanded the Third Dissent, and it could therefore be taken that Lichfield accepted the essentials of it. "Lord Lichfield would probably have signed it," Harrison wrote, "but for some passages and phrases which perhaps we had better have omitted. In substance he was entirely with us. On no point of proposed legislation did he differ from us."'· With regard to the Majority Report, it appears that Harrison was not as successful in remodelling it as he boasted. A comparison of the final fonn of that Report with the original draft does not suggest that Harrison had torn the latter to shreds. Probably he exaggerated his accomplishments when he wrote to Beesly in the heat of battle in December, 1868, for it is clear that the Majority Report derived principally from Booth's proposals, the bulk of it being taken word for word from his memorandum. Some important changes, however, were made in it by the Commission. Its strong anti-union tone was much modified, especially in the early sections which describe the organization, aims, and so on, of unions. The final Report of the majority of the Commissioners was therefore a much milder document than the original draft. Moreover, there are in the final Report two paragraphs taken directly from Harrison's memorandum. These are paragraphs 31 and 51 dealing with the relationship of unions to strikes and with their effects on the state of trade, which were taken over word for word by the majority." In addition, there are some parts of the Majority Report which are to be found neither in Booth's nor in Harrison's memoranda but which closely resemble the arguments of the latter. Paragraph 50, for example, which points out that anti-union evidence has come not from workmen but only from the masters, and the whole section on "The Effects of Trades Unions on the Trade and Industry of the Country"" clearly follow the general sense of the Harrison position. Finally, it should be noted that the section of the Majority Report on "Proposed Legislation" is only slightly dependent upon Booth; how much of it was contributed by the union spokesmen cannot be estimated.
All this, if hardly sufficient to justify what Harrison wrote to Beesly in December, 1868, is, perhaps, sufficient to warrant what he wrote to Brentano in 1873 when the latter inquired about the operations of the Commission. The Majority Report, he then wrote, was Booth's draft in modified form "with all its character cut out."'· Certainly, some of the credit for changing it must go to Harrison and Hughes, though it must be recalled that they were not the only dissenters in the Commission. Elcho, Merivale, and Lichfield also entered objections to the majority's recommendations and we may therefore assume that they too played a part in modifying the Booth draft in the course of the Commission's deliberations.
The Majority Report was neither the indictment the opponents of unions had been awaiting nor the programme the unionists wanted. Some legal protection for unions was recommended, but since the majority's position was based on the assumption that the office of the law was the maintenance of conditions of unrestricted enterprise, full legal status was denied. No combination, for example, was to be considered lawful which refused work with non-unionists, and the doctrine of restraint of trade was to be undisturbed. The majority, moreover, expressly approved important points in the existing law to which the wage-earners had long objected. This was the case with regard to picketing and breach of contract; and virtually the same position was taken with regard to the protection of union funds. eo There was, as the Webbs point out,61 nothing in these, the vital recommendations of the majority, to make the position of the unions worse. But there was little to improve their status or to ensure reform of the existing law in their favour. Applegarth had not a good word to say for them. The majority had in effect decided, he wrote, that there should be "one law for the rich and another for the poor, that trade unionists should be legislated for as 'a dangerous class' instead of as citizens of a free country .... "62 Harrison and Hughes took the same position. They, too, protested against the continuation of special laws against labour. They urged unqualified legalization of unions, protection of their funds, and the incorporation of the working classes into society by the repeal of all laws defining offences which they alone could commit.
The second part of Harrison's strategy in the final phase of the Commission's business called for bringing in a separate report to serve as the programme of the radicals and working men for the future." This Minority Report, written by Harrison·< and signed by himself and Hughes, was introduced as a memorandum when the Commission met in December. With virtually no change it was printed in the Commission's Final Report as an appendix to the Third Dissent, a full statement of the minority position.
The first part of Harrison's report soon was reckoned a classic defence of unionism-or rather of mid-Victorian unionism, the Old Unionism as it was shortly to be known. According to Capital and Labour, the organ of British capitalists, which devoted three articles to it, "as a piece of special pleading in favour of unions it is almost exhaustive and in that sense has considerable value. It is improbable that the case of the unions can be presented again in so attractive and specious a fonn."65
Harrison based his apology largely on the big unions, the "amalgamateds," upon which the party of capital had mistakenly con- centrated in the course of the investigation. In basing his rationale of union principles and practices on them Harrison was able to exploit many of the bourgeois prepossessions of the day and so make out a strong case for full legalization and for the other reforms the unions wanted. Unions were composed, he noted, for the most part of the upper classes of labour. Not all the skilled workmen were members, but "it has not been suggested by anyone that the union is ever composed of the inferior order of workmen, although it may not invariably be composed of the superior."" The structures which these workmen had developed in the past few decades ranked with the biggest and the best of big business. The Amalgamated Society of .Engineers, for example, had a centralized organization and membership roll, a budget, a range of services, and a national scope to its activities that placed it on a level with a large railroad or a first-rate mercantile company." It was equally as conservative, efficient, and respectable; and its wealth and size gave it a sense of responsibility to which the small trade clubs of an earlier age of unionism had never aspired.
It may be said that those societies which offer the greatest amount of assurance benefits to their subscribers are just those which are least disposed to expend their accumulations in labour contests. Over a period of ten years the engineers with 33,000 members have expended in benefits £459,000, in disputes £26,000, or about 6 per cent; and the ironfounders with 10,000 members have expended in benefits £210,000 and in disputes £5,300 or about 2Y. per cent of their funds. We thus see that in proportion as the unions acquire extent in their area) regularity and publicity in their transactions, and become properly constituted associations, they gain in character and usefulness. In proportion as they are irregular in organization and approach the form of the old secret trade union, without "benefits," they preserve some criminal features of the surreptitious unions under the old law." In Harrison's hands the union enterprise became one of the great examples of Victorian business success-and of moral progress.
Harrison exploited the prejudices and assumptions of the day in other ways: he pointed to the parallel and accepted practices of commercial companies and of employers' and professional associations; he appealed to the Victorian conscience about the conditions of labour (defining a trade union as an organization for "securing the most favourable conditions of labour") ; he postulated the ideals of harmony of interest and equality before the law; and so on.'· The foundation of his case, however, he saw in the idea of freedom. The working classes like the masters, he argued, deserved to be free to pursue their own interest as they saw fit and to the best of their ability. Though 68Eleuenth and Final Report of the Commissioners, I, xxxii.
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there were no differences of interest between working classes and general public, there was a real conflict between masters and men. In this battle of interest, in which neither party acknowledge any obligation beyond that of securing their own interests, the only safe rule for the state appears to us to be absolute impartiality. So long as no breach of the general law results, and no legislative restriction exists, the conse· quences of their conduct must be borne by each party for themselves.'lO
The concept of the neutral state was thus a fundamenal assumption. Combination was simply the correlative of competition, the means by which the weaker pursued their own interests. As long as it was assumed that every man was duty-bound to secure his own interest, the state had no ground for outlawing the method of the weaker group while it honoured that of the stronger. Unionism was not a new protectionism i it was an extension of the principle of Free Trade. "We can understand no freedom of trade in which workmen are not free to stipulate with an employer in concert for their own conditions." Restriction was not in accord with the spirit of modem legislation.
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Having, in the form of conclusions from the evidence, made out his case for the social and legal acceptance of unions, Harrison went on in the second part of his Report to deal with reform of the law. The existing law was obviously, he pointed out, faulty in many respects. It was vague and uncertain and it made every association of masters and men seem illegal in some respect. Worse still, class discrimination was one of its principles. The Combination Act applied in practice only to workmen. It defined as criminal such acts as "verbal threats," "molestation," "intimidation," when done by workmen in combination, though these acts were criminal in no other context. And finally, the existing law left union funds open to embezzlement, as the decision in Hornby v. Close had demonstrated. Legislation was therefore necessary, and Harrison went on to argue that it ought to be based on the principle of freedom-freedom for the working classes to organize and bind themselves as they pleased.
The programme of reform Harrison proposed in the conclusion to his Report was simple in the extreme." Three of his four recommendations were negative: the repeal of the Combination Acts, and the suspension, by simple declaration, of the Law of Conspiracy and of the Common Law doctrine of restraint of trade so far as unions were concerned. By the removal of these three items from the existing "labour laws" complete liberty of association and of action would be conferred upon the working classes, and the basic principle of the Minority Report realized. AIl working-class organizations would be 70Ibid., xxxviii.
71I~id., lxiii. legal. They would be enabled to pursue any objectives they wished, and working men like other citizens would be subject only to the general criminal law of the land. It was on these grounds that Harrison's Report was hailed as the "complete charter of trade union liberty."
The one positive recommendation had to do with the protection of union funds and property. In this regard Harrison prop06ed a detailed scheme of legislative reform by which the unions would enjoy the benefits of the Friendly Societies' Acts, including protection against unscrupulous officers, and the privileges of summary remedies against fraud and embezzlement, but not be open to suit. As J. M. Ludlow, Registrar of Friendly Societies, put it at the time of the Taff Vale Case, Harrison's provisions secured the unions full protection for their funds "without giving any corresponding hold on the unions themselves." " The skill with which Harrison devised these arrangements was praised by the Webbs who saw in them "a striking instance of the advantage to a labour movement of expert professional advice.""
The results of the Royal Commission's labours seem clear. First, the long investigation and the reports issued by the Commission were of vital importance in bringing about a great change in public opinion with regard to combinations. J. S. Mill, who publicly identified himself with Harrison's Report, noted the change in a letter of June, 1869, written in support of the trade union bill of that year. I have been happy to observe that the indiscriminate prejudice against trade unions which had been so much stimulated by the atrocious crimes brought home to the officers of a few of them by the inquiries of the Royal Commission has been greatly corrected by the general results of those inquiries ... ,11S
Union leaders were of the same opinion. The speeches of Potter and others at the Trades Union Congress of 1869" made it plain that they felt their standing with the public had been greatly improved by the work of the Commission and it is certain that they shared Mill's conviction that "the minority report of the Commission has been especially useful in promoting sound views on the subject."
The change in public opinion may be observed in the House of Commons and in The Times. The attitude The Times had held towards the unions on the eve of the Commission was most unfavourable.71 Editorials as late as March, 1869, on the Reports of the Commissioners were still far from friendly to the union cause; but by July they had altered their tone. A leader of July 8'8 pointed to the great change that had come over public opinion with regard to unions in recent months, a change best evidenced, they thought, by the sympathetic and enlightened reception the House of Commons had given to Harrison's trade union bill when introduced by Hughes the day before. The change in the attitude of the House was not, The Times went on to argue, the result of political pressure; nor was it the outcome of the new franchise. Rather it was the result of the Commission's labours. The reception of the bill, "speaks volumes for the effect of an impartial and exhaustive inquiry. The change which has come over opinion on the labour question, both in and out of Parliament, is mainly if not wholly, due to greater knowledge and wider experience." The leader concluded with the remark that it was not "restraint of trade" but rather keeping unions beyond the protection of the law which was contrary to public policy.
Trade unions will continue to exist, and to number half a million mem~ bers, whether they are protected by Act of Parliament or not. True statesmanship will seek neither to augment nor to reduce their influence, but accepting it as a fact will give it free scope for legitimate development.
Second, the trade union movement was re-united and re-vitalized hy Harrison's Report and programme of reform. The old rivalry between the Junta of Applegarth, Allan and company on the one hand and George Potter and the provincial unionists under whom the Trades Union Congress had begun on the other, was put aside when all sections found in the Minority Report a common programme for political action. The Conference of Amalgamated Trades and the London Trades Council gave the Report and its proposals their endO"lement at a delegate meeting of unions held at the Bell Inn, April 21, 1869,79 and the Trades Union Congress in its sessions of that year passed a series of resolutions which embodied Harrison's proposals and made them the official legislative programme of the whole union movement. S. The first steps in what was to prove one of the best organized and most successful of nineteenth-century lobbies were taken at once. The Trade Union Bill of 1869, drafted by Harrison and embodying the largest part of his reform plan, was immediately put before parliament and pressed upon it by all the resources of the union movement.
Sl By 1875 the entire "charter of trade union liberties" had been carried into the statute book and it may therefore be claimed that the Minority Report ranks as one of the most important documents in the history of British trade unionism and as a milestone in the history of labour. 
